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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
CONTRACTS FOR SERVICES DISTINGUISHED FROM THOSE TO
SELL GOODS
THE PROBLEM
An agreement to furnish false teeth, considered by an English court in
1861,1 and one to supply photos of a dog, which was construed by a New York
court in 1945,2 indicate the chronological and to some degree the logical boun-
daries of a troublesome legal problem. Set forth without its numerous refine-
ments the question posed is the true distinction between a contract for work,
labor and services, and one to sell goods. A statement of the problem as it
came before the court in one of the leading cases on the subject3 may serve to
point up some of the difficulties inherent in the search for a satisfactory solu-
tion. The plaintiff, a manufacturing corporation, agreed to fill an order for
cloth which called for the use of both cotton and silk in the process. It
agreed to supply the cotton and the defendant, who placed the order, was to
supply the silk. The defendant failed to deliver the necessary silk and the
manufacturer's looms stood idle and the cloth was never completed. On the
trial the court permitted the jury to compute damages on the theory that the
contract was one for work, labor and services. The plaintiff appealed, con-
tending that the agreement was for the manufacture and sale of goods. The
transaction had not been characterized as a sale in plaintiff's pleadings and a
reading of the contract shed no light on the intention of the parties. The
evidence showed that the cotton furnished by the manufacturer was greater
in bulk than the silk which the defendant was to contribute but the value of
the silk was in excess of the value of the cotton.
The aim of this paper is to attempt a clarification of judicial treatment of
the problem posed in its many aspects. A contract for work, labor and ser-
vices is clearly one in which a consideration is given in return for the exercise
of a certain manual skill or energy. 4 Viewed essentially, a contract of sale is
one in which the purchaser looks not towards the skill or energy of the vendor
but is primarily concerned with the finished product, and the consideration is
paid for the receipt of that product. 5 In the former contract the subject matter
1. Lee v. Griffin, I Best & Smith 272, 23 Eng. Rul. Cas. 191 (1861).
2. Lawrence v. Ytla, 184 Misc. 807, 55 N. Y. S. (2d) 343 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
3. Hargraves Mills v. Gordon, 137 App. Div. 695, 122 N. Y. Supp. 245 (1st Dep't
1910).
4. That such is the identifying characteristic has been recognized in various situations:
(a) where the agreement is to install fixtures, Carlson, Holmes & Bromstad, Inc., v. M. I.
Stewart & Co., Inc., 147 Misc. 607, 264 N. Y. Supp. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1932); (b) where a
farmer is to grow crops for another, Gilbert v. Copeland, 22 Ga. App. 753, 97 S. E. 251
(1918) ; (c) where tools manufactured are retained and used in the performance of assem-
bly work for another, Garvin Machine Co. v. Hutchinson, 1 App. Div. 380, 37 N. Y. Supp.
394 (1st Dep't 1896); (d) or where an optometrist furnishes glasses, Babcock v. Nudel-
man, 367 fI1. 626, 12 N. E. (2d) 635 (1937).
5. "A sale is defined as any transfer of title or possession, or both, for a consideration."
Matter of Sears, Roebuck & Co.. 279 N. Y. 184, 185 (1938); quoted in Matter of Penn.
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of the bargain, viewed in isolation, is skill or physical energy whereas in the
latter the parties look to the physical result of which skill or physical energy
are only accidental concomitants. The basic difference in the two types of
contracts becomes immediately apparent when stated. Yet the involved cir-
cumstances of a particular transaction may make it impossible to determine
the nature of the contract without dealing in presumptions. It is often true
that elements of both types of contracts are intermeshed. An attempt may
be made to ascertain the actual intention of the parties but this frequently
proves fruitless. Intentions when expressed are often veiled and vague and in
a great number of cases are not set forth at all for it is characteristic of con-
tracting businessmen to look towards the commercial rather than the legal
ramifications of their bargain.6 But even when ascertainable, intention may
not always be the determinant for frequently the force of tradition 7 or the
exigencies of public policy8 may be legally decisive of the relationship. In the
absence of clearly defined intention or some external legal necessity the courts
are forced to resort to their own devices to label the transaction, by constru-
ing the "legal intent" of the parties. In effect the courts are merely remedying
blind spots in the legal process which exist because of their quite human in-
ability to look into the minds of the litigants. This has caused the growth
of an involved system of presumptions in which comparative weights, quali-
ties, quantities and values play a major role.
The clarification which this paper attempts is not merely of academic inter-
est. In many ways the issue of liability or the extent of the damages re-
Whiskey Distrib. Corp. v. Bruckman, 256 App. Div. 781, 783, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 718
(1st Dep't 1939). "A change in the beneficial ownership of the thing dealt with, and a
price, paid or promised, and certain or capable of being ascertained, are essential ingre-
dients of a sale." Jackson v. McIntosh, 12 F. (2d) 676, 678 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926). Also
see N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 82.
6. In this connection it should be observed that the courts will not generally isolate a
phrase used by laymen contracting without bexefit of counsel, and hold the parties to
all the implications of its most technical legal meaning. As Shientag, J., expresses it, "The
law does not expect business men to use the formal words of the statute in their dealings
with one another; most of them have probably never read the statute. The precise word
is not the sovereign talisman." Carlson, Holmes & Bromstad, Inc. v. M. I. Stewart &. Co.,
Inc., 147 Misc. 607, 609, 264 N. Y. Supp. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
7. Building contracts are affected by the force of the traditional view that the law
has taken to real property. Thus a contract to furnish and affix chattels to the realty
is a contract of work and labor, Walstrom v. Oliver-Watts Construction Co., 161 Ala.
608, 50 So. 46 (1909) ; yet the parties are in law held to have contracted with the under-
standing that the title to the materials passes and partakes of the character of the realty
when they are affixed. Steiger Terra Cotta, etc. Works v. City of Sonoma, 9 Cal. App.
698, 100 Pac. 714 (1909).
8. Considerations of public welfare have moved the courts to take the view that sup-
plying food to restaurant patrons is a sale of goods and thus carries with it an implied
warranty of fitness. Temple v. Keeler, 238 N. Y. 344, 144 N. E. 635 (1924), although a
dearly expressed intent to the contrary will probably be given effect. Cf. Haag v. Klee,
162 Misc. 250, 293 N. Y. Supp. 266 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
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coverable can rest wholly upon a determination of whether the contract is one
for work, labor and services or a sale of goods. A cross section of the cases
dealt with in this paper may be used in illustration. In the following situa-
tions the solution of the problem enabled the courts to resolve the issue
stated: (a) whether it was a contract for a sale of goods or whether it contem-
plated the rendition of services thus making the defendant liable for the negli-
gence of his agent in rendering the services; 9 (b) whether the transaction
was a sale enabling the plaintiff to claim a vendor's privilege and lien or
whether his claim is restricted to recovery for labor and materials;10 (c) whether
a constable who had seized property under an execution was liable in trespass
on the ground that the contract was one for the performance of services on
the chattel or whether it was for a sale of goods and his defense was valid;'
(d) whether the plaintiff was a mere seller of material or whether he was to
supply services and incidental material and was therefore a sub-contractor
bound to comply with the plans and specifications of the principal contract;' 2
(e) whether the contract was for the performance of services or whether it
was for the sale of goods thus entitling the plaintiff to recover the agreed
purchase price because of defendant's omission to reject or return the goods
or notify the plaintiff of non-conformity; 13 (f) whether a contract to raise a
crop of beans was one for services upon bailed seeds thus enabling the plaintiff
to maintain an action in trover for wrongful conversion or whether it was for
the sale of the seeds and the title was at all times in the defendant;' 4
(g) whether the transactions were renditions of services or whether they were
sales and the defendant was therefore liable for a retailer's occupation tax;1"
(h) whether there was contemplated the performance of services on chattels
of the plaintiff or whether it was a sale and by the rules of pleading the plaintiff
cannot recover in trover; 16 (i) whether defendant is liable on an oral promise
to purchase manufactured goods or whether the contract was for a sale of
goods and within the statute of frauds.17
Certain fundamental differences in factual situations are recognized by the
courts in handling contracts involving elements of a contract to sell goods
and one for work, labor and services. Problems raised by a contract which
provides for the contribution of materials by both parties are distinguishable
from those inherent in a contract where all of the goods are supplied by one
of these parties. A contract of either of the foregoing types considered with
9. Wyllie v. Palmer, 137 N. Y. 248, 33 N. E. 381 (1893).
10. St. Mary Iron Works v. Community Mfg. Enterprise, 9 La. App. 743, 119 So.
564 (1929).
11. Gregory v. Stryker, 2 Denio 628 (N. Y. 1846).
12. Granette Products Co. v. A. H. Neumann & Co., 200 Iowa 572, 203 N. W. 935
(1925).
13. Mack v. Snell, 140 N. Y. 193, 35 N. E. 493 (1893).
14. D. M. Ferry & Co. v. Forquer, 61 Mont. 336, 202 Pac. 193 (1921).
15. Babcock v. Nude]man, 367 IL. 626, 12 N. E. (2d) 635 (1937).
16. Austin v. Seligman, 18 Fed. 519 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1883).
17. Atlas Shoe Co. v. Rosenthal, 242 Mass. 15, 136 N. E. 107 (1922).
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reference to the Statute of Frauds presents a third situation calling for the
applications of an anomalous rule. In our attempt to evaluate judicial treat-
ment of the subject matter of this paper we shall observe these three basic
groupings.
JOINT CONTRIBUTION OF MATERIAL
At some point in time the ownership of one of two contributors to a com-
pleted article must be extinguished unless the substance of the bargain en-
visions joint-ownership. For reasons of commercial expediency, joint-owner-
ship is seldom a practical arrangement and may be disregarded except in special
types of contracts. The alternative, side ownership in one of the parties, in
many instances involves abstruse questions of construction. Civil law has
supplied the basic rule of reason in the principle of accession.' 8 Briefly ex-
pressed the solution which it suggests is that the owner of the principal and
major portion of the joint-contribution acquires title to minor additions, the
nature of which was merely accessorial. 19 Yet under certain circumstances this
principle has its inadequacies, as where the value and quantities contributed
by each of the parties is identical or where the value of the skill, labor and
accessories added by one party equals or exceeds that of the material fur-
nished. The cases touching upon the principle of accession may be consid-
ered under a number of aspects.
(a) Bailments for Repair
Where a contract provides that a mechanic or laborer is to repair or mend
an article given to him by another for that purpose, the transaction is a bail-
ment for the rendition of services thereon and the owner of the article retains
the title2 0 When materials are added by the repairman the nature of the
transaction does not change, and the consideration paid is for work, labor and
services primarily and only incidentally for the materials furnished.21 Title
to the material added passes by accession to the owner of the article to be
repaired. Upon analysis the purpose of such a transaction is to remedy
defects in an already existing article which is fully determined in character
18. See Pulcifer v. Page, 32 Maine 404, 405 (1851) citing, Bracton, de acq. rerum dom.,
B. 2, c. 2, § 3, 4 and Pothier, Trait du droit de proprilti, 1. 1, c. 2. art. 3, No. 169-180.
19. Betts v. Lee, 5 Johns. 348, 349 (N. Y. 1810); J. W. Snyder, Inc. v. Aker, 236
N. Y. Supp. 28, 134 Misc. 721 (Sup. Ct. 1929); Bozeman Mortuary Ass'n v. Fair-
child, 253 Ky. 74, 68 S. W. (2d) 756 (1934). However the doctrine does not operate
where a substantial change has been worked on the goods of another constituting a change
of species. See Betts v. Lee, supra; Lampton's Ex'rs v. Preston's Ex'rs, 24 Ky. 454, 455
(1829). Nevertheless if the change was wrought by a wilful wrongdoer he can acquire no
property in the goods however substantial the change providing the improved article
can be proved to have been made from the original material. Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y.
379 (1850).
20. Gregory v. Stryker, 2 Denio 628, 630 (N. Y. 1846); Twin City Motor v. Rouzer
Motor Co., 197 N. C. 371, 148 S. E. 461 (1929).
21. St. Mary Iron Works v. Community Mfg. Enterprise, 9 La. App. 743, 119 So.
564 (1929) ; Bozeman Mortuary Ass'n v. Fairchild, 253 Ky. 74, 68 S. W. (2d) 756 (1934).
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and is to be distinguished from a contract to fashion raw materials into a
new form.22 When repair is contemplated by the contracting parties the na-
ture of the contract is one in which work, labor and services are the principal
elements and the question of value is not to be considered. Thus even though
the value and the quantity of the new materials added to a dilapidated carriage
may be so grossly disproportionate to the worth of the carriage in its un-
repaired condition that for all practical purposes a new one has been manu-
factured, the courts will not find a contract to sell.23 A special contract may
be entered into, however, whereby the repairer may reserve title in the addi-
tions,24 but such an agreement will be tolerated only when the articles added
are separable and do not become a component part of the repaired object. 25
For reasons of policy the courts may find a special agreement to reserve title
even though not expressly made a term of the contract, when the addition
of parts is made to an article in the possession of a conditional vendee by a
person other than the conditional vendor. 26
(b) Manufacture of Goods
The contracting parties may, however, contemplate joint-contribution of
material on the manufacture of a new article essentially different in charac-
ter than its ingredients. Whether the labor expended upon an article and the
materials added to it result in a substantial change has often presented a diffi-
cult question but it is usually a problem in conversion,27 since the distinction
22. Contracts for the manufacture of a new article out of raw materials are later dis-
cussed herein. They involve the joint contribution of material by both parties. See
Hargraves Mills v. Gordon, 137 App. Div. 695, 122 N. Y. Supp. 245 (1st Dep't 1910) and
notes 29-35 infra and the unilateral contribution of material to the manufacturer. See
Ackerman & Hartnick v. Berkowitz, 123 Misc. 937, 206 N. Y. Supp. 624 (1st Dep't 1924)
and notes 65-79 infra.
23. Gregory v. Stryker, 2 Denio 628 (N. Y. 1846), but see Western Leather Co. v.
State Tax Comm., 87 Utah 227, 48 P. (2d) 526, 528 (1935) where the court reasoned that,
"when a shoe repairer delivers the repaired shoes to the owner thereof and receives pay-
ment therefor, the title to the materials used in the repair job passes to the owner. The
amount paid includes the price of the materials used. Such a transaction possesses all
the elements of a sale of the materials used in the repair job."
24. Clark v. Weels, 45 Vt. 4 (1872) where the plaintiff who had furnished wheels and
axles in repairing a stage coach and who had expressly reserved title to them was able to
maintain an action in trover against an innocent purchaser of the coach.
25. Motor Credit Co. v. Smith, 181 Ark. 127, 24 S. W. (2d) 974 (1930) ; John W. Snyder,
Inc. v. Aker, 134 Misc. 721, 236 N. Y. Supp. 28 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
26. For example, when the property affixed thereto by the conditional vendee had previ-
ously been mortgaged to a third party, Hallman v. Dothan Fidelity Co., 17 Ala. App. 152,
82 So. 642 (1919), or where the property affixed by the conditional vendee is owned by
a third party, Clarke v. Johnson, 43 Nev. 359, 187 Pac. 510 (1920). However, this con-
tention can be made by the third party only upon a showing that the chattel is convenient
to detach and has not become an integral part.
27. On that point see Betts v. Lee, 5 Johns. 348 (N. Y. 1810); Bozeman Mortuary
Ass'n v. Fairchild, 253 Ky. 74, 68 S. W. (2d) 756 (1934) and note 19 supra.
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between a contract to sell and one for work, labor and services does not depend
upon it. When a substantial change has taken place the conclusion may be
drawn that title to the fused product has passed to one of the two contributors
of material, but it is not authoritative in deciding which of the two. Other
tests must be applied and of these the most realistic, and yet the least prac-
tical, is the determination of intention. It may be termed the most realistic
because it is a frequently pronounced aim of the courts to attempt to carry
out the wishes of the contracting parties where that is possible. Nevertheless,
it may be termed the least practical because experience has proved that busi-
nessmen are seldom inclined to make such pronouncements in commercial con-
tracts, and the courts shy away from accepting verbiage as "words of art."
2
.s
Other aspects of the contracts are given careful consideration and quantity,
quality and value are often taken as indications of the "presumed" intent of
the parties. The quantitative approach is perhaps the most widely accepted
but even this may be qualified. When contracts provided that cloth was to
be sent to a tailor who was to make a garment and furnish buttons and twist;"
rough castings were to be supplied to a manufacturer who was to make pruning
shears and furnish the blades;30 old rails were to be delivered to a rolling mill
which was to make new ones and supply additional metal; 31 produce was to
be brought to a firm which was to make pickles and to furnish utensils and
ingredients; 32 material was sent to a manufacturer who was to make shirts
and add incidentals,33 the courts concluded that the transactions were essen-
tially bailments and that the contracts were for work, labor and services
rather than ones to sell. In each case the court found that the manufacturer
had supplied the lesser and merely accessorial part of the finished product.
Quantity of the respective contributions of materials was considered of greater
significance than the value of the manufacturer's labor in these cases. But a
recent New York decision reached a contrary conclusion.34 There the defendant
contracted for drop forgings and supplied the die and the steel to the plaintiff
manufacturer who added only incidentals. The court found that the contribu-
tion of the plaintiff's services to each casing was twenty-five cents whereas
the value of the steel supplied by the defendant was only two and one-half
cents and rejected the latter's contention that the contract was a bailment.
But an earlier New York case3 5 adopted an approach which is perhaps the
28. See the quotation from Carlson, Holmes & Bromstad v. M. I. Stewart & Co., Inc.,
147 Misc. 607, 609, 264 N. Y. Supp. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1932) set out in note 6, supra.
29. Pulcifer v. Page, 32 Me. 404 (1851).
30. Mack v. Snell, 140 N. Y. 193, 35 N. E. 493 (1893).
31. Arnott v. Kansas Pacific Ry. Co., 19 Kan. 95 (1877).
32. Sattler v. Hallock, 160 N. Y. 291, 54 N. E. 667 (1899).
33. Salant v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 188 App. Div. 851, 177 N. Y. Supp. 475 (1st
Dep't 1919).
34. Smith v. Brandenburg Inst. Co., - Misc. -, 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 264 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1944).
35. Hargraves Mills v. Gordon, 137 App. Div. 695, 122 N. Y. Supp. 245 (1st
Dep't 1910).
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most satisfactory of all. The plaintiff in that case, a manufacturer, contracted
to furnish cotton goods, and the defendant was to supply silk, both of which
were to be manufactured by the former into cloth. The court recognized that
intention, if it could be divined, would be controlling. Stating that the true
question to be determined was whether the contract was one for manufacture
and sale or an agreement whereby the plaintiff was employed to manufacture
goods and thus contemplated the performance of work, labor and services,
the court made an exhaustive but fruitless investigation of the words of the
contract and collateral correspondence. It found that the manufacturer's
contribution of material was greater in bulk and that the silk supplied by the
defendant was greater in value but it rejected both of these facts as conclu-
sive. A study of the nature of the plaintiff's business showed convincingly that
it was a manufacturer and a seller and that it was not in the business of hiring
out its employees and loaning its looms for the manufacture of the goods of
others. On that ground it was held that the reasonable construction of the
agreement indicated that it could not have intended the employment of the
plaintiff and that the contract was not for work, labor and services but was a
sale. The soundness of the decision is apparent. It strikes at the heart of the
question. Unless employment is the essence of the contract, all work, labor and
services are merely secondary considerations and the subject of the bargain is
not the skill and energy of the manufacturer. A contract to sell looks to the
finished product. It is concerned with manufacture only in demanding that
specifications be met and the means to the end product are a matter of in-
difference. Where a contract for work, labor and services has been made, the
bargain primarily considers the exercise of the manufacturer's technical skill
and mechanical aptitude.
(c) Crops
The problem of joint contribution has arisen in a series of cases involving
the growing of crops. In general, the factual situations are identical. A
merchant furnishes seed to a farmer and the latter agrees to raise a crop. A
breach occurs and the merchant sues in trover asserting that the transaction
was a bailment and that the consideration to be paid is for work, labor and
services and not the purchase of the crop. Objection has been made to charac-
terizing such a transaction as a bailment, the main difficulty being that the
purpose of a bailment is to recover the subject of the bailment by redelivery,
whereas by the very nature of such a transaction the seed is destroyed in the
process of germination and the crop which results is an essentially different
article5 6 As such the new crop cannot be the new subject matter until it comes
into being. Under this circumstance the view taken by the exponents of the
sale theory is that it is necessary that the parties take some positive step
to transfer the title to the fully grown crop to the merchant.37 Some act of
36. (1922) 10 CA=an. L. REv. 360 commenting on Ferry & Co. v. Forquer, 61 Mont. 336,
202 Pac. 193 (1921).
37. Robinson v. Stricklin, 73 Neb. 242, 102 N. W. 479 (1905).
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appropriation would be necessary, for the title could not pass to the merchant
while the contract remained executory. It could not pass to him by operation
of law, when the crop was grown, by a recital in the contract that title was
to remain in him at all times, for title to goods potentially in existence will
not pasg until they exist in esse and have been appropriated. However the
contrary and apparently sounder view in such a case argues for a bailment
theory thus obviating considerations of potential existence.3 8  The finest
indication of an intent of the parties to attempt a bailment is where there's
an absence of any payment by the farmer for the. seed, the conclusion that
is drawn from that fact being that the seed was given over into the possession
of the farmer to be used by him for the merchant's benefit.3 9 The terms of
compensation to the farmer are a strong indication of the transaction intended.
Where the contract provides for compensation for the farmer's "services" at a
stipulated rate, independently of the prevailing prices of the grain, the infer-
ence is that the farmer agreed to sell this labor and that it, rather than the
product of his labor, was the subject matter of the contract.4 Proponents
of the bailment theory further advert to the reasoning that the seed delivered
to the farmer was the principal article and that the ground in which the crop
grew was merely accessorial in the sense that it was in the nature of a "tool"
used by the farmer in growing the crop and thus the joint product of the
contribution should pass to the owner of the seed by accession. 41 An even
stronger argument is advanced when the land belongs to a third party.
4 z
Although under such a theory it is conceded that the original subject of the
bailment, the seed, disappears, the contention is that it is in fact supplanted
by its increase and thus the crop is the property of the merchant by recourse
to the principle that the bailor has the right to the return of his bailed article
plus its increase.43 Substantial authority has weighed the scales in the direc-
tion of a bailment and the contracts are generally recognized as ones for
work, labor and services. The nature of seed creates an anomalous circum-
stance in commercial transactions and the legal principles developed should be
extended to other types of contracts only with great care. Viewed de novo the
bailment theory in the seed and crop cases seems soundly reasoned as to its
38. Smith v. Washburn-Wilson Seed Co., 40 Idaho 191, 232 Pac. 574 (1925); Ferry &
Co. v. Smith, 36 Idaho 67, 209 Pac. 1066 (1922).
39. Ferry & Co. v. Forquer, 61 Mont. 336, 202 Pac. 193 (1921).
40. Gilbert v. Copeland, 22 Ga. App. 753, 97 S. E. 251 (1918); First St. Bk. of Wiggins
v. Simmons, 91 Colo. 160, 13 P. (2d) 259 (1932).
41. The court in Ferry v. Forquer, 61 Mont. 336, 202 Pac. 193 (1921), in developing
this argument cited examples of accession in such situations where (a) leather was made
into shoes, Mansfield v. Converse, 8 Allen 182 (Mass. 1864); (b) milk into butter or
cheese, Bank v. Schween, 127 Ill. 573, 20 N. E. 681 (1889); (c) or where live animals
were delivered to another who was to be compensated for keeping them, Edgar v. Par-
sell, 184 Mich. 522, 151 N. W. 714 (1915); Simmons v. Sehaft, 91 Kan. 553, 138 Pac.
614 (1914).
42. First St. Bk. of Wiggins v. Simmons, 91 Colo. 160, 13 P. (2d) 259 (1932).
43. Orser v. Storms, 9 Cow 687, 689 (N. Y. 1826).
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peculiar subject and in any event the judicial construction now appears to be
well rooted in tradition.
(d) Building
Contracts of building and construction involve a consideration that over-
shadows the views developed in the manufacturing cases. This new element
is the singular legal status of realty. Where contracts involve the transfer of
ownership in chattels the intention of the parties plays an outstanding part
in the construction of the contract.44 If the character of the manufacturer's
business raises conflicting inferenees as to whether employment or a sale
was contemplated,4" the issue may be concluded by determining which of the
parties has furnished the principal contribution of material.46  But when a
contract calls for the building of a house or provides for structural additions
thereto the contribution of the laborer is conclusively accessorial. It is a
deeply embedded principle that upon attachment to the building or the land
a chattel, which becomes a part thereof or is removable only with injury
to the structure, partakes immediately of the character of real property and
the title passes to the owner of the real estate.47 Questions involving the per-
manent character of the attachment and the operation of accession under
special contracts, such as conditional sales, are beyond the scope of this dis-
cussion.48 The passing of title to the owner of the realty by accession does
not require consideration of quantities or values. The dominant status of real
property in the common law makes it conclusively the principal contribution.
Orientated to the subject of the inquiry, the effect of the rule is that the house
or the addition has passed piecemeal to the owner of the realty while the
contract remains executory, and thus, when executed, compensation is given,
not to secure the ownership of property which has already vested but for the
work, labor and services of the builder. 49 However, this type of contract is
44. Matteis v. United States, 57 F. (2d) 999, 1001 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); Priest v.
Hodges, 90 Ark. 131, 118 S. W. 253, 254 (1909). The importance of this principle is
brought home very dearly in the Uniform Sales Act. Section 19 provides in effect that
the detailed rules of construction in the Act are to be given effect only when the express
intention of the parties cannot be determined. 1 U. L. A. § 19.
45. The allusion here made is a reference to the doctrine of Hargraves Mills v. Gordon,
137 App. Div. 695, 122 N. Y. Supp. 245 (1st Dep't 1910) which has been previously
treated in the discussion of contracts which call for the point-contribution of material
to the manufactured article.
46. For instances where this principle of construction was applied in joint contribution
cases see notes 29-33 supra, and in cases of unilateral contribution, see notes 65-79 infra.
47. The authorities are cited in Lord v. Wooley, 82 Misc. 656, 114 N. Y. Supp. 385 (Sup.
Ct. 1913).
48. Some aspects of the passing of title to accessorial chattels were briefly dealt with in
note 26 supra.
49. In Hague v. Cleary, 48 P. (2d) 5 (1935) the court reached this conclusion
in holding that a contract to construct a psychopathic building for a city in accord-
ance with detailed plans was a contract for labor and not a contract of sale thus affect-
[Vol 15
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not to be confused with the so-called installation contracts whereby the owner
of a chattel, such as a furnace or a bathtub, agrees with the owner of a house
to sell and install his commodity.: At the time of the installation, title to the
chattel passes to the owner of the realty and the chattel partakes of the char-
acter of the real estate but, despite this similarity, it is nonetheless a contract
of sale. The subject matter of the contract, the furnace or the bathtub, ex-
isted in fully completed form prior to the attachment and title to a fully
completed article passed at that time. In building and construction contracts
the laborer never has title to a wholly completed article and title to the ma-
terial he supplies does not pass as a unit."'
Other contracts of construction, in which the end product is not an article
destined to become a part of the real estate, partake of very much the same
distinction. Is the contribution of the laborer principal or merely accessorial?
A series of cases involving the building of boats is illustrative of this prob-
lem. Such a contract looks to an end product which is essentially personal prop-
erty and thus the fact that the boat is to be built on the land of either party
is a neutral factor.52 A solution must be found in an examination of the joint-
contributions. Keeping in mind the rule which was suggested as most relia-
ble in the manufacturing cases,53 an attempt should be made to characterize
the ship-builder's buisness to determine whether employment was the subject
matter bargained for. If that element is indecisive a quantitative evaluation
will probably be the solution,5 4 but where equality of contribution robs that
approach of force, a contract of construction may be susceptible of an exam-
ing a wage scale under a statute. The court's argument rests upon an analogy to the
so-called Massachusetts "special order" rule, which is independently discussed in the text
of this article, although the Statute of Frauds, in respect to which the doctrine was orig-
inally developed, was not involved.
50. See the text of this article and cases cited in notes 80-83, infra, where installations
are separately considered.
51. A comparison of Andrews v. Durant, 11 N. Y. 35 (1854) with Lord v. Wooley,
82 Misc. 656, 114 N. Y. Supp. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1913) shows a very material distinction
that must be made in this regard. In the former case the contract was for the building
of a sailing vessel and the court decided that during the course of the construction the
vessel was not yet in esse and thus no title was vested during the progress of the work
in the party for whom it was agreed to be constructed even though payments were made
to the builder from time to time. But in the latter case plumbing fixtures were to be
joined to the realty and the court remarked that title to the fixtures would pass to the
owner of the realty upon their annexation during the course of the work. However, in
both of these instances, the question as to whether the contract is for work, labor and
services or a contract of sale must be separately considered.
52. See Johnson v. Hunt, 11 Wend. 137 (N. Y. 1834), commenting on the site of the
construction as affecting the rule in Merritt v. Johnson, 7 Johns. 473 (N. Y. 1811).
53. See the discussion of Hargraves Mills v. Gordon, supra, in the text of this article
and notes 29-35.
54. This approach has been widely used in contracts for manufacture involving the
joint-contribution of the materials. See the cases cited in notes 29-33 supra. But it is
properly used only as a secondary rule of construction as has been indicated.
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ination of the qualities involved. Thus in the ship-building cases where there
is a finding that the builder constructed the boat upon framework owned by
another, the contract has been deemed one of work, labor and service. If the
materials for the hull or the framework are supplied by the owner the result
is the same and all subsequent additions become the property of the owner of
the hull by accession and no sale is involved.55
UNILATERAL CONTRIBUTION OF SIATERIAL
A contract involving the contribution of material by only one of the two
contracting parties may appear at'first blush to be easily classified. However,
a reading of the cases belies any such conclusion. The fact that property is to
be delivered to another for a consideration does not conclude the transaction
as a contract to sell, for further investigation may show that a later return
of the identical article was contemplated and that the money paid was for
the value of the use. On the other hand there are contracts in which the
intention of the parties clearly looks to the passing of complete and unquali-
fied ownership of material from one to the other and yet the courts may as a
matter of policy or tradition reject the implications of a contract to sell.
Without dealing further in such generalities we shall pass to a consideration of
these principles in operation.
(a) Storage and Depositaries
A great number of cases exist which provide in substance for the delivery of
chattels to another with the understanding that the same or similar articles
are to be returned upon demand or on a given date. The legal sign-post which
characterizes the transaction is whether or not the identical goods are to be
returned.5 6 If so the depositary is a bailee, and, if a consideration is to be
paid by him, it is in compensation for the use of the article and the transac-
tion is a bailment for hire, but, if the consideration is to be paid by the original
owner of the chattel, the contract is one in the nature of work, labor and ser-
vices. 57 The delivery of the possession of an automobile can serve to illus-
trate these contracts. If the owner of a car lends his vehicle to another to be
used by the latter and a stated payment per hour is to be paid it is a bail-
ment for hire. However, placing one's automobile with a garageman to be
delivered upon request is in the nature of a contract for work, labor and ser-
55. Andrews v. Durant, 11 N. Y. 35 (1854); Merritt v. Johnson, 7 Johns. 473
(N. Y. 1811).
56. Ross v. Michaelyan, Inc., 57 F. (2d) 674, 675 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); Scott Mining
v. Schultz, 67 Kan. 605, 73 Pac. 903, 904 (1903); Norris v. Boston Music Co., 129 Minn.
198, 151 N. W. 971, 972 (1915).
57. In Union Stock Yards v. Western Land Co., 59 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 7th, 1893)
the contract provided for the tending of the bailor's cattle. Compensation paid on their
return would be in payment of services rendered by the bailee and not a resale. Since
title remained at all times in the bailor, the young born of such animals would be return-
able as an "increase" in the cattle. Rogers v. Highland, 69 'Iowa 504, 29 N. W. 429
(1886); Kellogg v. Lovely, 49 Mich. 131, 8 N. W. 699 (1881).
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vices. But the contract may provide for the return of a like quality and
quantity of goods. This is a contract to sell and not a bailment and the legal
effect is that title in the goods delivered passes to the one who receives them.55
In general the precise fact as to whether the identical chattel is to be returned
is not difficult-to determine and the nature of the bargain is apparent.59 Fungi-
ble goods occupy a different status however since whether the goods to be
surrendered are identical is subject to a more elastic test. In that class of
cases, which generally involves the storage or sale of grain, it is felt that the
return of a like quantity or quality falls within the spirit of "identical arti-
cle" since it is in fact immaterial to the depositor whether the very same par-
tides find their way back to the original owner.6 Accordingly, it is not in-
dicative of a contract to sell that the fungible goods are to be commingled
with others of like quality and other tests are adopted. Where the owner takes
a receipt a further complication arises. If the receipt calls for the return of
a like quantity and quality it is a bailment but only if the recipient promises
to keep a sufficient supply on hand to satisfy contingent demands.61 When
provision is made for the payment of money upon surrender of the receipt, it
is a contract to sell, even though the price is not determined at the time of
deposit.62 Sometimes the receipt provides for the exercise of an option to
receive money or grain. If the option is with the depositor the transaction
continues as a bailment until such time as he determines to accept money,s
but when that option is with the recipient it is a contract to sell.64
(b) Manufacture
Overwhelming authority holds that when material in raw or unfinished form
is sent by the owner to be manufactured into a completed product the contract
is one for work, labor and services.65 Vexing problems of accession arising
from the joint contribution of material are not involved in these cases. How-
ever, a theory analogous to accession is applied. It is reasoned that the owner
58. Vardeymark v. Corbett, 131 App. Div. 391, 115 N. Y. Supp. 911 (3d Dep't 1909);
Finch v. McClellan, 77 Ind. App. 533, 130 N. E. 13 (1921).
59. Roeser v. Overless, - Tex. -, 34 S. W. (2d) 906 (1931).
60. McGrew v. Thayer, 24 Ind. App. 578, 57 N. E. 262 (1900); Sexton v. Graham,
53 Iowa 181, 4 N. W. 1090 (1880). Commercial necessity encouraged the adoption of this
rule and the fungible character of the goods justifies the exception, but the analogy should
not be applied to other chattels, such as livestock which are not properly fungibles.
61. State v. Folger, 204 Iowa 1296, 210 N. W. 580 (1926); Togerson v. Quinn-Shepard-
son Co, 14 Minn. 380, 201 N. W. 615 (1925).
62. Norton v. Woodruff, 2 N. Y. 153 (1849); Finch v. McClennan, 77 Ind. App.
533, 130 N. E. 13 (1921).
63. State v. Broadwater Elev. Co., 61 Mont. 215, 201 Pac. 687 (1921).
64. Barke v. Boulder Milling Co., 77 Colo. 230, 235 Pac. 574 (1925).
65. Powder Co. v. Burkhardt, 97 U. S. 110 (1877); Cohen v. Silberherg, - Misc. -,
173 N. Y. Supp. 407 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Meyer v. Metropolis Knitting Mills, - Misc. -,
154 N. Y. Supp. 209 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Swift v. Barnum, 23 Conn. 523 (1855); First
Nat'l Bk. v. Kilbourne, 127 Il1. 573, 20 N. E. 681 (1889).
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of the goods acquires an ownership in all additions or perfections which accrue
so that, even if the particular skill of the manufacturer multiplies the value
of the material, title remains in the former owner and the contract never as-
sumes the status of a sale.66 This presumption is so strong as to be conclusive
even though the parties have used language peculiar to a sale. 7 If it is un-
mistakably the actual intent of the parties the court might hold it to be a sale.68
In the absence of such clear actual intent the court would probably resist any
inference of a contract to sell and thus the character of the manufacturing
business, which plays so major a role in contracts of joint-contribution, would
not weigh heavily. 69 Where contractso have provided for the manufacture of
milk into cheese,70 silk into shirts,7 ' yarn into cloth,72 logs into boards,7"
leather into shoes 74 or cloth into coats,75 they have been held to be for work,
labor and services. However, the provisions of such contract should be closely
scrutinized for it is possible to have an agreement to sell incidental materials
independently of the main contract of bailment.76 The transaction may be-
come a contract to sell under certain other circumstances which are incon-
sistent with the character of a bailment. If the nature of the agreement is
that raw materials are to be delivered to a manufacturer who is to return
articles of the same value and not the identical material in altered form,77 or
if the manufacturer is given an option to return the processed goods or the
value thereof less the cost of processing,7 8 it will be found to be a contract to
sell. However, the fact that there is to be a division of the proceeds of the
sale of the finished product between the owner of the raw material and the
manufacturer79 does not destroy the character of a bailment in which com-
pensation is paid for work, labor and services rendered.
66. In this respect the rule is analogous to the rule in bailment-for-repair cases out-
lined in Gregory v. Stryker, 2 Denio 628 (N. Y. 1846). See notes 20-23 supra.
67. Ackerman & Hartnick v. Berkowitz, 123 Misc. 937, 206 N. Y. Supp. 624 (Sup. Ct.
1924); Ginsberg v. Kugler, - Misc. -, 174 N. Y. Supp. 143 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
68. As where the manufacturer of suits expressly purchased lining from his customer
for use in the suits to be made, Brenner v. Greenburg & Greenburg, - Misc. -, 183
N. Y. Supp. 22 (App. T., 1920).
69. See the rule of construction developed in Hargraves Mills v. Gordon, supra note 35,
and the comments thereon in the text of this article.
70. Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500, 28 N. E. 594 (1891); First Natl Bk. v. Kil-
bourne, 127 D1. 573, 20 N. E. 681 (1889). However, see Butterfield v. Lathrop, 71 Pa. St.
225 (1872), where the milk was indiscriminately mixed with other milk.
71. Ginsberg v. Kugler, - Misc. -, 174 N. Y. Supp. 143 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
72. Meyer v. Metropolis Knitting Mills, - Misc. -, 154 N. Y. Supp. 209 (Sup.
Ct. 1915).
73. Pierce v. Schenck, 3 Hill 28 (N. Y. 1842).
74. Mansfield v. Converse, 8 Allen 182 (Mass. 1864).
75. Kafka v. Levensohn, 18 Misc. 202, 41 N. Y. Supp. 368 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
76. Brenner v. Greenberg & Greenberg, - Misc. -, 183 N. Y. Supp. 22 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
77. Foster v. Pittibone, 7 N. Y. 433 (1852).
78. Austin v. Seligman, 18 Fed. 519 (S. D. N. Y. 1883).
79. Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500, 28 N. E. 595 (1891). This is also true when the
contract provides for an equal division of the processed chattels. Pierce v. Schenck, 3 Hill
28 (N. Y. 1842).
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(c) Installations
In our discussion of building and construction contracts some indication
of the problems involved in installation contracts was suggested. An agreement
is generally made for the purchase of a fixture which, when considered apart
from the problem of installation, contains all the elements of a contract to sell.
Two facts affect the legal aspects of any such contract. As has been previ-
ously set out in greater detail, articles made a part of land, or buildings thereon,
acquire the character of realty upon attachment, by the principle of accession.
Installations which are made piecemeal partake of the character of contracts
for work, labor and services by force of this rule since title to the material
passes with the attachment of each component and there is not that single
transfer of title to a fully completed article which is characteristic of a sale.80
The second fact which carries great force in the installation of fixtures is the
weight to be given to the skill and labor involved. It is often true that the
manner in which the articles are made a part of a dwelling, an office or a store
is of greater moment to the owner than the chattel itself. This was found to
be so in the installation of a beauty parlor where the court felt that the indi-
vidual fixtures as such meant nothing to the owner and held the contract to
be one for work, labor and services.8 ' Because of the presence of both material
and labor as elements inducing compensation, the cases quite naturally over-
lap for the test is really one of degree and the difficulty of determining which
of the contributions is incidental cannot be reduced to a formula, although
comparative values can at least serve as a useful guide. Where the material
to be furnished can be seen as the primary subject of the consideration, it is
viewed as a sale82 and the services of installation are deemed collateral and in-
cidental. The boundary line is a matter of judgment located by examining the
elements of the bargain until some element, quantitative or qualitative, tips
the scales in one direction. 83
80. Compare Andrews v. Durant, 11 N. Y. 35 (1854), Lord v. Woolley, 82 Misc. 656,
144 N. Y. Supp. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1913) and Carlson, Holmes & Bromstad, Inc. v. M. I.
Stewart & Co., Inc., 147 Misc. 607, 264 N. Y. Supp. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
81. Carlson, Holmes & Bromstad, Inc. v. M. I. Stewart & Co., Inc., 147 Misc. 607, 264 N.
Y. Supp. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1932). Thus the courts will entertain suits on a quantum meruit basis
for work, labor and services plus incidental materials furnished. Raile v. Peerless American
Products Co., Inc., 192 App. Div. 506, 182 N. Y. Supp. 721 (1st Dep't 1920); Borup v.
Von Kokeritz, 162 App. Div. 394, 147 N. Y. Supp. 832 (2d Dep't 1914).
82. W. Trigg Co. v. Bucyrus Co., 104 Va. 79, 51 S. E. 174 (1905).
83. Some aspects of the problem are considered in Knoxville Tinware Co. v. Rogers,
158 Tenn. 126, 11 S. W. (2d) 874 (1928). No one approach is always conclusive but
generally an evaluation of the technical difficulties of installation will provide the answer
as indicating whether services were contracted for. Although it has been suggested that
the "special order" rule of construction can be applied to determine whether or not the
article is peculiarly adapted to the individual needs of the owner of the building or store,
Carlson, Holmes & Bromstad, Inc. v. M. I. Stewart & Co., Inc., 147 Misc. 607, 264 N. Y.
Supp. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1932), nevertheless that rule was originally adopted in Massachusetts as
an exception to the operation of the Statute of Frauds (see notes 98-106 infra) and is more
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(d) Professional Services
When contracts involve the taking of stenographic notes, 4 the printing of
a manuscript 5 or the furnishing of a financial report,8 6 the transaction is not
a contract to sell despite the fact that material is given in return for a con-
sideration. A highly trained aptitude in a special field is recognized as the
essence of the commodity bargained for.87 The parties are unquestionably
contracting with reference to the professional skill to be rendered and the con-
sideration is paid for it and not the material incidental to the services. Thus
contracts entered into with an architect for a building plan,88 credit investi-
gators for financial reports,8 9 a writer for newspaper articles,90 an optometrist
for glasses,91 were held to be for work, labor and services on the ground that
the materials were merely an incidental element of the agreement. 92 When
a person contracts with a photographer to take his photo the transaction par-
takes of many of the characteristics of a contract of sale. In such a contract
the one who sits for his photograph contributes none of the material involved.
The photographer supplies the studio, the camera, the film and the prints and
in addition exerts his skill and energy with only the passive cooperation of
the sitter. Nevertheless it is universally established that the contract is one
appropriate for that purpose. The only universally recognized approach is an attempt to
determine which factor is incidental. See Granette Products Co. v. A. H. Neumann & Co.,
200 Iowa 572, 203 N. W. 935 (1925); M. K. Smith Corp. v. Ellis, 257 Mass. 269, 153
N. E. 548 (1926).
84. Morelock v. Hail, 138 Tenn. 657, 200 S. W. 519 (1918).
85. Washington Printing Co. v. State, 192 Wash. 448, 73 P. (2d) 1326 (1937).
86. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. City, 168 Misc. 215, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 597 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
87. This approach was used in England in some of the earlier cases under the Statute
of Frauds. In 1852, Pollock, C. B. in Clay v. Yates, 1 H. & N. 73 said ". . . the true
criterion is, whether work is the essence of the contract, or whether it is the materials
supplied. My impression is, that in the case of a work of art, whether in gold, silver,
marble or plaister, where the application of skill and labour is of the highest description,
and the material is of no importance as compared with the labour, the price may be
recovered as work, labour and materials." Although subsequent decisions in England have
adopted a different test under the Statute of Frauds (see subsequent treatment in this
article and notes 104-106 infra) the reasoning is fully applicable today in any general
distinction of the two-types of contracts.
88. Gaastra v. Bishop's Lodge, 35 N. M. 396, 299 Pac. 347 (1931).
89. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. City, 168 Misc. 215, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 957 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
90. Associated Newspapers v. Phillips, 294 Fed. 845 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
91. Babcock v. Nudelman, 367 Ili. 626, 12 N. E. (2d) 635 (1937).
92. The fact is that the courts will give the greatest attention to determining the
principal and secondary character of material and services with direct reference to the
peculiarities of the transaction before them. Thus it has been found that the contract
is one for work, labor and services rather than a sale when the parties understood that
completed lithographs would be of no commercial value to any one else, Central Litho-
graph Co. v. Moore, 75 Wis. 170, 43 N. W. 1124 (1889); A. B. C. Electrotype Co. v.
Ames, 364 Ill. 360, 4 N. E. (2d) 476 (1936); or where a picture of a particular size is
painted, Racklin-Fagin Const. Corp. v. Villar, 156 Misc. 220, 281 N. Y. Supp. 426 (Sup.
Ct. 1935).
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for work, labor and services.93 It is the nature of the contract that makes it
so. The contract looks towards the performance of a service by the photogra-
pher in which the prime commodity is the artistry of the photographer and
the material which is involved is only incidental to the service rendered. Con-
sequently the relationship is one of employment and the employer acquires a
proprietary right in the photograp. 4 Conversely when the services are of
a less professional stature and involve a lesser degree of special skill, they
may be considered incidental to the material and constitute a contract to sell,
as for example when a company agrees to send its representative to instruct
purchasers in the handling of fireworks.98 Although the distinction does in-
volve close questions of fact in some instances where the degree of skill is less
obviously in the nature of professional quality, the cases adopt a fundamen-
tally sound approach in that they recognize the subject matter of the bargain
as the ultimate test.
(e) Service of Food and Liquor
Authority is strongly divided on the construction of contracts for the ser-
vice of food and liquor. The controversy centers about the character of meals
ordered by a diner in a restaurant. Proponents of the theory of a contract
of service are a fast receding minority.9 6 They represent the retreat of a tra-
ditional rule before considerations of public policy as interpreted by the
courts. At common law it was conceded that innkeepers were supplying their
services for a stipend and thus it followed that a diner could not carry off
the food he had not consumed. 7 But the growing recognition of warranties
of fitness in the law of sales gradually encroached on this type of contract.98
Efforts have been made to rationalize the theory of a sale with dubious success.
It is argued that cooking and serving food do not involve such a high degree
of skill, that the meal is only incidental and that there is no great difference
between ready-to-eat food products available in retail stores and cafeterias and
what is served in restaurants.9 9 However, the more candid reasoning is that
93. Lawrence v. Ylla, 184 Misc. 807, 55 N. Y. S. (2d) 343 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Holmes v.
Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 225 App. Div. 360, 233 N. Y. Supp. 153 (1st Dep't 1929);
White Studio v. Dreyfoos, 156 App. Div. 762, 142 N. Y. Supp. 37 (1st Dep't 1913).
94. White Studio v. Dreyfoos, 156 App. Div. 762, 142 N. Y. Supp. 37 (1st Dep't 1913).
However, when a person submits to being photographed for general distribution of his
picture to the public, the property in the prints and the negative are in the photographer.
Press Publishing Co. v. Falk, 59 Fed. 324 (C. C. A. 2d, 1894).
95. Wyllie v. Palmer, 137 N. Y. 248, 33 N. E. 381 (1893).
96. Nisky v. ChIlds, 103 N. J. L. 464, 135 Alt. 805 (1927); Prinsen v. Russos, 194
Wis. 142, 215 N. W. 905 (1927).
97. The common law rule and the argument for a contract of service are fully dealt
with in Nisky v. Childs, 103 N. J. L. 464, 135 Atl. 805 (1927).
98. Social aspects involving warranties are discussed by Rugg, C. J., in Friend v.
Childs Dining Hall, 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407 (1918), who argues strongly for con-
:struction 'of these contracts as sales.
99. VoLD, SALEs (1931) § 153, p. 477.
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a diner has a greater need for protection than the ordinary over-the-counter
shopper and the law of warranty applicable to the sale of goods affords the
only satisfactory protection.10° Accordingly the courts have reached out to
adopt the law of warranty is a matter of social expediency.'0 1 Perhaps the
more logical approach would have been to recognize the transaction as a con-
tract for services and read into it a warranty of wholesomeness. Some courts
have indicated that they take an analogous view by construing the contract
as one of sale only as respects warranty.10 2 The New York courts would appear
to have made a clean break with the traditional view in holding the furnish-
ing of food to be a contract to sell, but even in New York some remnants of
the old rule remain wherever the court can find that the consideration was
in fact paid for services rendered. 10
3
QUESTIONS UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Among the earliest cases which sought to distinguish between a contract of
sale and one for work and labor were those which arose under the Statute of
Frauds, .0 4 which rendered unenforceable contracts for the sale of goods above a
stated value unless the buyer accepted and received part of the goods or made a
part payment or gave something in earnest to bind the contract or unless
there was a writing signed by the party to be charged or his agent. The dis-
tinction was created by the courts to block the efforts of those who sought
to escape the obligations of their contracts with those who had performed
work and labor, by pleading the statute as a technical bar to enforcement of
the contract. 0 5 Since the statute gave to the unscrupulous an opportunity for
sharp dealing by taking advantage of a statute enacted to prevent, and not
to foster, unconscionable dealing, the courts were quick to devise means to
work out an evasion of the rigor of the statute in favor of the laborer, who
has traditionally merited special protection, by declaring certain contracts
enforceable on the ground that they were for work and labor and not contracts
of sale. The courts adopted different approaches to the problem and the
100. Temple v. Keeler, 238 N. Y. 344, 144 N. E. 635 (1924).
101. An entirely different problem is presented under statutes making criminal the
sale of liquor without a license. If the liquor is dispensed to a bona fide member in a
selected social club, compensation is deemed to have been paid for services within the
meaning of the statutes. People v. Adelphi Club, 149 N. Y. 5, 43 N. E. 410 (1896);
Commonwealth v. Ewig, 145 Mass. 119, 13 N. E. 365 (1887). However, the contract is
not considered to be one for services when the club is used only as a subterfuge. People
v. Andrews, 115 N. Y. 427, 22 N. E. 358 (1889); State v. Mercer, 32 Iowa 405 (1871).
102. Barrington v. Hotel Astor, 184 App. Div. 317, 171 N. Y. Supp.*840 (1st Dep't
1918); Stanfield v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 143 Kan. 177, 53 P. (2d) 878 (1936); Schuler
v. Union News Co., 295 Mass. 350, 4 N. E. (2d) 465 (1936).
103. Haag v. Klee, 162 Misc. 250, 293 N. Y. Supp. 266 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
104. The pertinent sections of the original statute and the details of subsequent
amendments are set forth in BENJAaMM, SALE OF PERSONAL PROP. (7th ed. 1931) 165 et seq.
105. See Note (1931) 16 CORN. L. Q. 412, 416-417, quoting from Carlson v. Cheely,
6 Ga. 554, 560 (1849).
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decisions gave rise to a host of divergent views which eventually coalesced
into three major rules.
(a) The English Rule
The leading case in England on the subject of work and labor under the
Statute of Frauds is Lee v. Griffin,'O6 which reconciled some of the conflict-
ing views in that country. Suit was brought on a contract wherein the plaintiff
had been commissioned to make a set of false teeth for the defendant's testa-
trix. In holding that the contract was within the statute and denying recovery
the court adopted the implications of an earlier English statute. The gist of
the court's reasoning was that if at the time of delivery the subject matter
of the contract is one which could be presently sold as a chattel, it is a sale of
goods and within the statute, but if only work and labor have been expended
and the end-product is such that could not presently become the subject of a
sale the Statute does not apply. Of the different views this one is the least
sympathetic to an evasion of the Statute.
(b) The New York Rule
Perhaps the simplest of the views to apply was that enunciated in Parsons
v. Loucks,10 7 which is recognized as expressing the New York rule, although
even that state has now accepted the Massachusetts "special order" rule, infra,.
which was adopted by the authors of the Uniform Sales Act. The parties in
that suit were copartners who had agreed that the defendant partner should
manufacture and deliver to the plaintiff ten tons of book paper. The defend-
ant breached and pleaded the Statute of Frauds. The court found that the
paper was not in existence at the time of the contract but was to be brought
into existence by the labor and service of the defendants. On that ground the
Statute was held not to apply and the distinction was made between a sale
of goods in existence at the time of the contract and an agreement to manu-
facture, which did not fall within the Statute. Although concededly a con-
venient rule of thumb, the rule was by no means realistic. It erred on the
side of liberality in permitting an evasion of the statutory restrictions in a
great number of cases where the hardship which the distinction sought to-
relieve, did not exist. The view is particularly objectionable in the case of a
manufacturer who customarily manufactures goods out of his own raw ma-
terial for general distribution. It is the nature of his business to sell his
products on the open market to the general public.10 8 The services which he
performs to complete his products are a matter of indifference to the pur-
chaser for no particular specifications are called for, and other willing buyers
exist under normal conditions. None of the circumstances, which call for the
106. 1 Best & Smith 272, 23 Eng. Rul. Cas. 191 (1861).
107. 48 N. Y. 17, 517 (1871).
108. The effect of this element as bearing upon the intent of the parties has been pre-
viously treated in other connections. See notes 35, 45, 53, and 69 supra and the topics
in the text of the article which they annotate.
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protection of one who has labored, are present and exception to the operation
of the Statute of Frauds would seem unwarranted.
(c) The Massachusetts Rule
Reflection upon the- original reason for relaxing the application of the
Statute of Frauds reveals the so-called Massachusetts rule as the most sensi-
ble.1 9  It has now been adopted in the Uniform Sales Act.110  Mixer v.
Howart,"' a Massachusetts case, first took the approach to the Statute of
Frauds which has been named the "special order" test. A subsequent case
in that state, gave classical expression to tle distinction. Goddard v. Binney
involved a contract for a carriage. The defendant had ordered a buggy and
specified that the lining was to be drab, the outside seat was to be of cane
and his monogram and initials were to be put on the buggy. It was completed
as ordered and destroyed by fire two months later while still in the manu-
facturer's possession. Suit was brought and the Statute of Frauds was pleaded.
The court upon appeal entered judgment for the manufacturer. It was pointed
out by Justice Ames that "a contract for the sale of articles then existing,
or such as the vendor in the course of his business manufactures or procures
for the general market, whether on hand at the time or not, is a contract for
the sale of goods to which the statute applies. But on the other hand, if the
goods are to be manufactured especially for the purchaser, and upon his special
order, and not for the general market the case is not within the statute."' 13
Unquestionably this rule, though it does not express the basic distinction be-
tween a contract of work, labor and services and a contract to sell, is most
aptly fitted to the purpose for which it was evolved. That purpose was to
denominate a class of cases to which the Statute of Frauds would not apply.
Since the reason for attempting any such distinction was to ameliorate the
rigor of the law when a laborer was involved, the "special order" rule is the
most intelligent. An article manufactured to particular specifications has a
value to the one who ordered it but not necessarily to anyone else. Conse-
quently if the Statute bars an action the laborer is left with an article in which
he has made an investment of work and materials with no prospect of realizing
fair compensation for it. He cannot compel the defendant to take it because
the contract is unenforceable and a sale would probably secure him an in-
adequate return because of the difficulty of securing a purchaser with the
particular tastes of the defendant and the resulting necessity to sell at a sub-
109. However the English rule of Lee v. Griffin, supra, note 106, is favored in 2 W rr-
LiSTON, CONTRAcTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 509.
110. 1 U. L. A. § 4(2). See Lieberman v. Templar Motor Co., 236 N. Y. 139, 140 N. E.
222 (1923); Gura v. Herman, 227 App. Div. 452, 238 N. Y. Supp. 230 (2d Dep't 1929);
but where the manufacture is to be by a third party it is held to be within the Statute
of Frauds. Eagle Paper Box Co. v. Gatti-McQuada Co., 99 Misc. 508, 164 N. Y. Supp.
201 (Sup. Ct. 1917); Atlas Shoe Co. v. Rosenthal, 242 Mass. 15, 136 N. E. 107 (1922).
111. 2 Pick. 205 (Mass. 1838).
112. 115 Mass. 450 (1874).
113. Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450, 454-455 (1874).
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stantial discount. The contrary is true where the goods were in existence at
the time of the contract or were of a type generally manufactured by the
plaintiff for the general market. 1 4 In the former case the assumption can be
made that it would not have been made unless a market existed for it,1 5 in
the latter case the marketability is an established fact. No hardship is in-
volved. If the Statute bars an action on the contract, the manufacturer may
at least in theory still find a willing purchaser at a fair value.
The distinctions drawn between a contract of sale and one for work and
labor under the Statute of Frauds are to be employed only when the operation
of that Statute is involved. 6  Rules developed under this class do have a
narrow application. They are to be confined to the single question of whether
the Statute may be allowed to operate upon a particular contract. Reasoning
developed in that line of cases should not be extended to the determination of
other questions involving work, labor and service contracts. Properly consid-
ered, all of the contracts involved are contracts of sale and are termed con-
tracts of work and labor only to express the legal result achieved where the
Statute is held not to apply. It may be said of them that they are in every
sense, but one, contracts of salej n 7 Insofar as they are not subject to the pro-
hibition of the Statute they are considered contracts of work and labor. Indeed
the full realization that such contracts are for all other purposes to be consid-
ered contracts of sale is had in the recognition that, except for the single
issue of whether they are affected by the Statute of Frauds, they are fully
114. This would be the situation in the so-called New York rule which has been aban-
doned in favor of the Massachusetts rule incorporated in the Uniform Sales Act. As early
as Cooke v. Millard, 65 N. Y. 352, 619 (1875), a legislative change in the rule was advo-
cated by the New York courts, although at that time they favored the approach of Lee
v. Griffin, supra note 106.
115. The good sense of the Massachusetts rule can here be seen in another connection.
Possibility of liability asserted on perjured testimony is considerably lessened when suit is
brought on a special order. The singularity of the object manufactured under special
order to some degree precludes gratuitous assertions of contracts entered into. Thus in
Flynn v. Doughtery, 91 Cal. 669, 27 Pac. 1080 (1891), the order was for stone cut to
the specifications of an architect's plans, and in Gies v. Bauscher Bros., 160 Mich. 502,
125 N. W. 420 (1910), the order called for the manufacture of dishes bearing the mono-
gram of the party sought to be charged which had been permanently burned into the
dishes at a high temperature.
116. Restricted use of the principle arises from the fact that the distinction was de-
veloped for the solution of a particular problem involving the operation of the Statute
of Frauds and thus though relevant to that purpose may be inapplicable in other con-
nections. However, see Carlson, Holmes & Bromstad, Inc. v. M. L Stewart & Co., Inc., 147
Misc. 607, 264 N. Y. Supp. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1932), where the special order rule was ad-
verted to in the construction of an installation contract, and Hague v. Clelry, - Cal. -,
48 P. (2d) 5 (1935), where the contract called for the erection of a building. In neither of
these cases was the Statute of Frauds involved.
117. This same device has been used by the courts in developing implied warranties
of fitness in the restaurant cases previously discussed where the service of food was con-
sidered a sale only insofar as it carries a warranty. See note 102 supra.
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amenable to the Uniform Sales Act which controls all questions arising from
them.1
18
CONCLUSION
Mathematical exactitude cannot be demanded of the courts in their treat-
ment of these cases. The fundamental distinction between contracts to sell
and contracts for work, labor and services, except where rules of policy are
involved, must in the final analysis rest in the intention of the contracting
parties. That full freedom to determint the force and effect of commercial
transactions should not be denied to those whose interests are at stake is a
principle that has often been given lip service. By any fair estimate it has been
observed. Where rules of construction have appeared to produce artificial
solutions the blame cannot always be laid at the feet of the court. In search-
ing for the intent of contracting parties they are working under human dis-
abilities that make unexpressed intention inscrutable. Formal pronounce-
ments of legal intention in commercial contracts are not to be expected of
even the most capable businessmen. Agreements are entered into to outline the
assumed obligations of business dealings and not for the convenience and edifi-
cation of the courts. It is often true that a legal construction of a contract
involves a patchwork job and the exactitude of insight cannot be expected
to be any more perfect than the expressions or inferences of intention. In gen-
eral it may be stated that the court will seek to enforce the intended obliga-
tions of the parties and where the intention cannot reasonably be divined, com-
mitments, which the court believes parties who made such a bargain ought
to have intended, will be imposed. Inferences from collateral factors will then
be determinative. The proper weight to give each element of the bargain is a
matter of judgment in each type of case. We have previously indicated the
potency of certain of these factors. The character of the work to be done, the
nature of the parties' businesses, the manner in which compensation is to be
paid, the peculiar subject matter of the contract, the comparative values of
the material and the services should all be objects for consideration and the
relative force of each will be found to vary under different factual setups.
A classification of some of these situations has been suggested herein and
the weight of the respective elements evaluated. In each class of cases a
common denominator may be found, that is, an earnest attempt by the court
to give the same legal effect to the contract which would follow if the mute
aims and purposes of the agreement were ascertainable."19
118. In such connection it is possible for the courts to hold that the contract is not a
sale in the sense that it is within the Statute of Frauds and yet that in every other respect
the Sales Act is controlling.
119. This is not to say that in all instances the courts will allow inexact expressions
of intent to determine the legal consequences of an agreement, and this is particularly true
when tie weight of tradition (e.g., the principal of accession) or the dictates of public
policy (e.g., implied warranties in the service of food) point in the opposite direction.
Where this is true a clear showing of an intent contrary to the general rule must be shown.
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